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Abstract: 
New information technologies alongside their benefits also bring new dangers with themselves. It is 
difficult to decide which authentication tool to use and implement in the information systems and 
electronic documents. The final decision has to compromise among the facts that it faces several 
conflicting requirements: highly secure tool, to be a user-friendly and user simplicity method, ensure 
protection against errors and failures of users, speed of authentication and provide these features for 
a reasonable price. Even when the compromised solution is found it has to fulfill the given technology 
standards. For the listed reasons the paper argues one of the most natural biometric authentication 
method the dynamic biometric signature and lists its related standards. The paper also includes 
measurement evaluation which solves the independence between the person’s signature and device 
on which it was created. 
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Introduction 
The IS plays one of the key roles in a company’s functioning (Koch, Chvátalová, 2017). Secured 
information system has to prevent its misuse or help to identify and convict its attacker. Findings 
of security gaps should also serve as an improvement of the security to prevent further attacks 
orpossible cyber-crimes. For this purpose the so called logs are the record of the activities of the 
computer system and all persons (users, administrators, service, etc.) that can be associated with 
a security incident (Smejkal, 2015). In this case the issue of access control, identification, verification 
and authentication of people and processes is the key question. 
The main terms such as identification, authentication and access control are some of the most 
frequently used terms of the information system security field. This is where the cornerstones are 
represented for building a secure information system. The same way they play a significant role in the 
investigation of cybercrime, the manner in which the crime was committed, i.e. beside other things also 
the manner in which the perpetrator gained access to the computer system and information medium and 
what took place in the system. (Porada, Smejkal, 2017)  
Generally, by identification we understand the recognition of any entity by the system on the basis 
of a specific identifier which is associated with a particular person or thing, represents their identity, and 
can be known to other people. As far as humans are concerned it is the first and last name, user name, 
birth certificate number, social insurance number, identification card - ID number, etc., further for things 
it can be the car license plate, serial number, officially assigned number (e.g. personal document 
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number), etc. (Mates, Smejkal, 2012). In this case, the identification means finding out the identity of the 
subject which is done by comparing personal data or expressions of the character of a real person with 
other persons, while authentication is a verification that the subject is who they poses as through this 
identity.  
Authentication is the process of the verification of the declared identity of the subject. As far as 
humans are concerned, it is carried out by means of objects (cards, smart cards, mobile phones and 
others), witnesses, signs of a personal nature (signature, voice, gait, etc.), personal characteristics 
(fingerprints, iris), knowledge (password, PIN, security question, etc.). As far as things are concerned, it 
can be authentication against a checklist, sending an automated query and comparing answers with 
information stored in the system, etc. 
Access control is a security arrangement based on the security policy of the authority 
(organization). Its purpose is to provide access according to the access rights of the authority to 
authorized users and prevent unauthorized entities from access. For the purpose of security audit or 
billing, etc. the system can gather information on the made accessions (authentication, logins, etc.), see 
figure1. 
Figure 1: Logics of access control system 
 
Methods 
The secondary research uses scientific papers as resources which were collected for specified 
purposes for clarifying the benefits and pitfalls of authentication technologies. The advantages and 
disadvantages of biometric authentication methods were briefly explained. The law and legislation 
requirements are also collected and dealt with (regulations and cyber law in biometric technologies). 
From a wider perspective the focus is then shifted to the dynamic biometric authentication. One of the 
objectives is to define and isolate the dynamic biometric signature among the other authentication 
methods. The discussion part mainly argues why the dynamic biometric signature was selected for 
authentication under these conditions: 
 area and space independency; 
 to be user-friendly and acceptable for users; 
 authentication Process continuity and stability; 
 ensure the subject aliveness via automated remote testing. 
Here mainly empirical comparison of authentication possibilities were performed. It summarises 
the results of many years of research activities by the authors in the field of the dynamic biometric 
signature, including experiments. The end research also concludes the comparing of this type 
of signature with a signature based on cryptographic methods with a view to the current eIDAS 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council). 
The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate the benefits of the dynamic biometric signature as 
authenticating method and to explain its standards. In further experiments all the available pads 
produced by the company Signotec were used. These pads differ from each other in terms of their 
design, the size of the signature field, resolution, sampling rate, and even the scanning method used – 
a regular pen or a special pen using the ERT (Electromagnetic Resonance Technology). 
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The so called on-line DBS was examined. The purpose of the experiments was to show the 
possible change of the stability of the DBS of a signer depending on the scanning device. As the sample 
represented people of both sexes aged 20 to 65, the size of the heterogeneous sample used was 
statistically representative enough. 8 scanning devices were used (see listed in Table 1). The sampling 
frequency of the used devices can be set up to 150 Hz, 250 Hz or 500 Hz. The scan rate (sampling) 
was set up to recommended 250 points/sec. The x, y, time and pressure coordinates were scanned. 
The experiment was attended by 40 people in one session.  The testing was carried out on the following 
dynamic biometric signature devices with the various technical parameters produced by the company 
Signotec GmbH in the last five years: 
Table 1: Dynamic biometry - behaviourism characteristics 
Method of the signature capture Model of the dynamic biometric signature device 
The active pen, display, and pen are 
mutually synchronized 
Signotec Alpha Pad (hereinafter referred to as Alpha – 
ERT) ST-A4E-2-UFTE100: Color LCD Signature Pad 
Alpha ERT (Electromagnetic Resonance Technology) 
The display is electromagnetic, the 
pressure is captured on the basis of 
the outward pressure of the passive 
pen on the display 
Signotec Delta Pad (hereinafter referred to as Delta – 
ERT) Touch display ST-DERT-3-U100 ERT  
The display is electromagnetic, the 
pressure is captured on the basis of 
the outward pressure of the passive 
pen on the display 
Signotec Gamma Pad (hereinafter referred to as 
Gamma – ERT) Touch display ST-GERT-3-U100: 5" 
Color LCD Signature Pad Gamma ERT 
The display is a touch-screen, the 
pressure is captured on the basis of 
the outward pressure of the passive 
pen 
Signotec Omega Pad revision B (hereinafter referred to 
as OmegaOld – TD) Touch display ST-CE1075-2-U100 
(old version) 
Signotec Omega Pad revision E (hereinafter referred to 
as OmegaNew – TD) Touch display ST-CE1075-2-U100 
(current version) 
Signotec Sigma Pad revision B (hereinafter referred to 
as SigmaOld – TD) Touch display ST-ME105-2-U100-B 
(old version) 
Signotec Sigma Pad revision E (hereinafter referred to 
as SigmaNew – TD) Touch display ST-ME105-2-U100-B 
(current version) 
There is no display, only the touch 
area 
Signotec Sigma Lite (hereinafter referred to as 
SigmaLite – WD) Touch area without a display function 
STLT105-2-U100 
Authentication information and authentication factor 
Authentication during direct contact is based on different attributes from personal knowledge. 
In this case the security of authentication process is directly proportional to the maturity of applied 
procedure. User authentication in information technologies have to ensure the same conditions as 
in standard implemented activities, i.e. to ensure the data exchange between authorized users while 
ensuring the performed actions not being declined etc. 
When communicating at a distance (remote communications) as well as in the case 
of man/machine communication the situation is even more complex than in the case of personal contact 
(physical presence of both parties – the person being authenticated and the one authenticating) 
because the possibility of forgery of identity is more risky (Smejkal, Kodl, 2008). For example in the case 
of live voice communication (e.g. phone banking / telebanking), the level of the risk is very diversified – 
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from high in the case of the identification of a recurring password or a small set of them (digits of the 
birth certificate number) to negligible (when using the chart of one-time passwords or the authentication 
calculator). During authentication by means of technological tools, the risk is usually medium to high 
while the function is not only the properties of a method or product but also the user’s behaviour and 
properties of the environment, in which the authentication is carried out. 
During authentication of a subject, the verification can be linked into the main authentication 
groups so called authentication factors which can be: 
 knowledge (something that we know) – e.g. password, PIN, secret key; 
 ownership (something that we own) – e.g. token, smart card, authentication calculator; 
 characteristics (something that we are) – the biometric information which can be obvious 
(fingerprint, iris, etc.) or hidden (behaviourism or dynamic biometrics e.g. while walking or 
signing). 
However, in the general literature we find one fourth authentication factor (Hortai, 2017). The 4th 
fact of authentication factor represents the physical location or current geographical position (e.g. 
personal visit of the bank or known person). In the case of electronic communication this authentication 
factor can serve e.g. the GPS coordinates (latitude and longitude of the present position) of the device 
or the location of the workstation (IP address), etc. (Lenzini et al., 2008). This 4th factor can be very 
useful during the direct contact but in remote communications some situations can provide probability 
of identity counterfeit (proxy servers, remote hacking, etc.) and so a risk of authentication. For this 
reason this paper does not focus on these types of location based authentication. 
 
Authentication factors combination and multifactor authentication 
The basic authentication method is the single-factor authentication. This means that the user 
proves his identity by one of the three types of evidence - the proof of knowledge, the proof 
of ownership, the proof of characteristics of the person (or the location based which this paper do not 
count with).  
The most common known method is the proof of knowledge - PIN, password or phrase which are 
attached to the identifier such as username, sign-in name or login ID. Nowadays however, we need to 
focus on multidimensional authentication when a solution based on a combination of two or three 
authentication factors are concerned (Hortai, 2015-a). 
The lack of knowledge security based on one-factor authentication highlights the example 
of authentication failure of iCloud (cloud system from Apple Inc.) in the summer of 2014 (Arthur), when 
the negligence of its creators allowed hackers to hack into the users’ data (big boom caused the nude 
photos of celebrities). 
For higher security it is wise to combine the authentication factors among themselves. Venn 
diagrams were used for clear representation of authentication factors combinations (see Figure 2). 
Three basic groups are single-factor authentication where the authentication factors are separate sets 
of knowledge, ownership/tools and characteristics of the user/person. These factors represent many sub 
methods. Other variants arise by overlapping these sets (combining them with one another) which 
in these forms create a multifactor authentications. Option 2F-A is a two-factor authentication 
by combination of an authentication tool (e.g. bank card, SIM card) and knowledge based authentication 
(e.g. PIN). It is therefore possible to uniquely identify the owner by the authentication tool and its proper 
secret code. The 2F-B part comes by overlapping sets of ownership and the user’s characteristics, it 
also represents a two-factor authentication, for example: the use of face recognition and identity cards. 
The last possibility of two-factor authentication is part 2F-C e.g. it is the use of a fingerprint reader along 
with a password. The part where all three sets are overlapping is the 3F group which represents three-
factor authentication (Huang, 2011). In this issue all three authentication factors are used at least once. 
This presented orientation leads to a strong multifactor or multiparameter authentication where the 
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successful solution depends upon (to some measure) on the sophisticated process for utilization 
of these authentication parameters. 
 
Figure 2: Combination of authentication factors 
 
Biometric authentication 
Biometrics is a set of scientific disciplines which examines the human and other living organisms 
by measuring their unique characteristics. The recognition of people may be based on their anatomical 
characteristic features (physiological) or behavioural characteristics (Jain, 2015). 
Biometric data are used to uniquely authenticate people. The monitored user’s characteristics 
must be first scanned and then securely saved. The identification is done by comparing the currently 
measured biometric characteristics of the subject with securely saved records of these characteristics 
(etalons). The authentication system determines whether the authentication request accepts (the 
currently measured characteristics and the data of the authentication device are “identical”, it is within 
the tolerance) or rejects it (there is a difference above the set of acceptancy threshold). 
To use biometry in IT authentication systems is relatively new (compared methods of knowledge 
based authentication) and faces some basic problems. The main threats are possible attacks with fake 
biometric models. The attacker could use faked biometry for verification (e.g. authorized person’s 
fingerprints model or rubber mask of the copied face) where the biometric sensor would measure the 
same biometrics as the original which were copied and so the system would "successfully" authenticate 
the fraud user. Protections against such attacks could be: 
 Use biometrics which are difficult to model, fake or use non hidden- dynamic biometrics. 
 Verify that the verified object is actually alive. There are several approaches and 
measurements: simple thermal readers (hand, face), blood pulse in the veins readers, capturing 
the visual impact of the human body (dynamics), etc.  
The second problem is that there is no 100 percent reliability of biometrics sensors. Errors can 
occur when an authorised user is rejected from access or when a random user is evaluated as a valid 
one and then erroneously accesses to the system. The rates of these conditions are expressed with the 
variables (Banerjee and Woodard, 2012): 
 FAR - false acceptance rate 
The false acceptance rate, or FAR, is the measure of the likelihood that the biometric security 
system will incorrectly accept an access attempt by an unauthorized user. A system’s FAR is 
typically stated as the ratio of the number of false acceptances divided by the number 
of identification attempts, see in equation (1) below: 
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FRR - false recognition rate 
FRR is the measure of the likelihood that the biometric security system will incorrectly reject an 
access attempt by an authorized user. A system’s FRR is typically stated as the ratio of the number of 
false recognitions divided by the number of identification attempts, see in equation (2) below: 
 
𝐹𝑅𝑅 =
    
     
 (Equation 2) 
 
Each authentication application device puts different demands on the value of these 
characteristics. To have an idea of the value of these numbers I showed the example of one of the latest 
technology: technology Fujitsu PalmSecure which captures the unique bloodstream image of the veins 
in the palm of a person. In the internal research the company Fujitsu has achieved the rate of false 
accept FAR less than 0.00008% and a false rejection rate of only FRR = 0.01%. Some banking 
companies think this technology will replace credit cards in the future (Fujitsu, 2014). 
Biometric verification according to the number of comparisons 
Comparison of 1 to many: the present verified biometric sample is compared to each one of the 
given database samples (e. g. used in forensic sciences when the criminal is not known). 
The disadvantages of this approach are a higher risk of identification errors (wrong evaluations) and 
higher requirements of computing power of the verification system through comparing more samples. 
Comparisons 1 to 1: the present verified biometric sample is compared to the particular sample 
of the verified person. In this case preliminary identification (e.g. name, ID) of the verified person is 
required. This solution provides higher security and eliminates authentication mistakes with other 
entities. 
Dynamic biometric characteristics 
Each biometric characteristics has its effectiveness and disadvantages, and the choice depends 
on the specific application. No single biometric is expected to successfully meet all of the requirements 
(e.g., accuracy, practicality, and cost) of all applications (e.g., digital right management, access control, 
and welfare distribution) (Pal et al., 2014). Recent years instigated discussions about the use 
of biometric methods which, in the case of their static form still contain significant execution risk 
of accepting spurious persons based on the stolen or fraudulent (counterfeit) biometric information (fake 
fingerprint, iris image, etc.) (Smejkal, Kodl, 2011). Hence in light of the listed reasons, the focus has 
shifted on the dynamic biometric methods based on the human expressions, such as voice analysis, 
dynamics of movements, pressing computer keys, walking or writing. Dynamic biometric methods are 
based on capturing behaviourism or expressions of the authenticated person in the given period of time. 

















The entire method works by comparing the pathways curves that describe the specifi
of the body while moving. It is assumed that each person has their own: motion reactions, muscle
skeletal system and dynamic stereotypes, so everyone walks
be scanned in simple or complex scenes. Movement dynamics are detected at the centre of gravity of 
the body and at the break points of the body (usually the hips, joints: knee and ankle) (Rak et al., 2008). 
This method needs to create the pattern of the user’s movement
of the movement parameters is required. The advantage in this met
of cameras for example in public places (useful for forensic application) or 
specialized room is required for the authentication. The disadvantage is that it is difficult to determine 
the biometric pattern through the influence of psychological and physical condition of the individual. 
Movement of the individuals are unique and are suitable for comparison and for 1:1 identification. 
Identification through walking is more solved in the field of forensic science (Straus, Jonák, 2008) than 
solved as authentication technology.
 
Human voice dynamics analysis
The verification is based on the analysis of sound, vibration, pronunciation and speed of the 
human voice/speech. The voice characteristics depend on the person’s vocal cords size, mouth, nasal 
cavity, and further human parts in creation of the voice. This ana
groups: 
 Statistical analyses - independent of the text, working with long
using only voiced segments 
speech coefficients LPC (Lin
of individual symptoms (Han et al ., 2006).
 Dynamical analyses - suitable for the recognition of the speaker according to the text, to the 
determination of the time profiles of the selected speech p
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basic tone of the speech, frequency spectrum, the first formant, cylindrical vocal tract model, 
etc. 
Some authentication technologies make their decision on an analysis of words and whole 
sentences which are know only to the authenticated spokesman. Thus this is a two-factor authentication 
based on speech recognition and the validation of the knowledge (password or paraphrase). It is mainly 
used for authentication through voice communications: phone, VoIP (voice over internet protocol), etc. 
The advantage is that there is no need to implement any additional hardware. The user speaks into 
a device’s microphone and that is well known and acceptable for users. The downside is that the 
verification may be affected by the user’s health status (colds, fever, mental state of the speaker), 
ambient noise etc. In remote communication there is high risk of counterfeit: speech records, learned 
voice imitator algorithm, etc. (Smejkal, 2015). 
 
Human face movements 
This part summarizes the dynamics of human face expressions, gesticulations, eyes and mouth 
movements. Each of these have to be captured by a camera for a period of time and evaluated by 
specified algorithm so called computer vision methods (Hortai, 2015- b). 
The Literature on face recognition technology discusses the issue of face spoofing which can 
bypass the authentication system by placing a photo/video/mask of the enrolled person in front of the 
camera. This problem could be minimized by detecting the liveness of the person by using eye and 
mouth movements (Singh, 2014). 
 
Dynamics of pressing keyboard or console  
Each person writes otherwise (speed, time of presses key/button, frequency of keystroke, the 
length of the pause etc.) In this method it is difficult to create a precise etalon - it is necessary to re-write 
the text samples while capturing its dynamics (type more words several times, thereby reducing the 
error rate in afterwards verifying). 
The advantage in this method is that it doesn’t require any additional hardware. It uses the 
already implemented hardware (e.g. console, keyboard) (Banerjee and Woodard 2012). In IT systems, 
to verify the user they have to login first, and then they can be verified by scanning their key strokes. 
This method can be used as further verification of users which are already logged into the system and 
reveal unusual behaviour (no or too fast typing means that it is using an algorithm and not a real 
person), protecting the computer from children, etc.  
This activity can be interrupted or the user’s dynamics can be affected with fatigue or stress and 
by hand injuries this method is unusable for authentication (Tresner, Salykin, 2016). This solution 
represents a less accurate method (volatility of typing and high values of FRR) and should serve just as 
an additional authenticating method. 
 
Dynamics of mouse movements 
The user has to draw a determined shape which has been drawn in creating the reference etalon. 
To create user’s etalon it is necessary to draw the image a few times. By identification the drawn 
patterns specific features are extracted such as position, speed, strength and roundness, etc. which are 
then compared with the user’s standard etalon. Properties are similar to the dynamics of typing and are 
rather useful for verification (Zheng et al, 2011) after the user logs into the system. 
 
Screen touch dynamics 
Touch-screens, such as smartphones and tablets have the signs of user’s behavioural reflection. 
In this case the screen touch parameters can be measured (speed, touch frequency, time and force 
of pressure, the length of the pauses, etc.). (XI Zhao et al, 2014). 
 
 
EMI, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2017  





Dynamics of handwritten signature 
The biomechanical processes involved in the production of the human signature are very 
complex and not yet fully understood. In vastly simplified terms, the primary excitation is thought to 
occur in the central nervous system, more specifically in the human brain, with predefined intensity and 
duration describing the intent of the movement. The signal of the intent (or the movement plan) is 
passed through the spinal cord to the particular muscles which are activated in the intended order and 
intensity. As a result of such activation and loosen of the muscles and whilst holding a pen, the resultant 
of the arm movement is recorded in the form of a trail on the paper – the handwritten signature. Each 
individual person has an individual set of component movements (Smejkal et al., 2013).  
Automatic signature verification can be divided into two main areas depending on the data 
acquisition method (Lopez-Garcia, 2014): 
 offline (off-line),  
 online (on-line) signature verification. 
Off-line systems utilize the classic method of on-paper signature for the verification of a person. 
The obtained signature is digitized by an optical scanner or camera. There is an alternative to input the 
image through a tablet or any other suitable device. Subsequently, respective application determines 
the match of the person’s signature with a reference sample by comparing the overall trace (image) 
of the signature (Diaz et al., 2015). These methods are based on this particular principle and used to 
verify handwritten signatures. These methods are very unreliable and commonly practiced for example 
in retail and banking, where they are relying on the human factor in the form of a calligraphy expert 
(Smejkal, Kodl, 2011). 
On-line systems analyze the dynamical characteristics of handwriting which are obtained in real 
time, using specialized tablets, touch screens, PDAs, or other suitable devices (Francis et al., 2015). 
The verified person signs with their signature like on some paper or on the scan surface of the device or 
can use a specialized pen (the sensors are embedded in the pen). The dynamics, i.e. the whole process 
of creation of the signature in time is monitored. The handwriting’s dynamic properties are scanned i.e. 
the speed of the signature, acceleration of movements, timing, pressure and direction of the thrust, 
which are recorded in a multi-dimensional coordinate system (Galbally et al., 2015). The two dimensions 
of the signature movement are used to determine the speed and direction of the thrust, the third basic 
coordinate determines the contact pressure (Smejkal et al., 2013). The sensing units may vary from 
various manufacturers by the number of the monitored biometric vectors information (Lopez-Garcia, 
2014) and also the value of reliability may differs (values of FRR and FAR). 
The System after loading the parameters of the signature joins other information of the signed 
user such as user’s name, current time and date, the size of the document, etc. All the data are then 
encrypted and the so-called biometric marker is created and is sent for further processing (including 
in the signed document, login audit). 
Discussion 
The authentication methods should meet the variability in terms of applied technologies and 
systems, and in terms of users themselves. The proposed solution must also fulfill the requirements 
of the legal rights of the involved communication parties and authorized users. In the case of official or 
banking operations it has to meet the proper conclusion of the contract for transactions execution. 
Passwords can only be used at the lowest level of security. They are relatively easily observable, 
transferable and hackable by attacks (He and Wang, 2015). Tokens can be used for higher degrees 
of security. They are transferable and can be lost or stolen. The combination of token and password can 
be used for a relatively high degree of security (2 factor authentication). The combination of knowledge 
(password) and ownership (token) based authentication is highly resistant when the authentication tool 
is lost or stolen but again the human factor can fail and cause "inadvertent" disclosure of password or 
lending/borrowing the token to others (it is transferable). A key assumption for constructing secure 
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information systems is ensuring the proper identification and authentication of people, assets and 
events in the system (Smejkal, Kodl, 2016). It is only after high quality authentication that we can move 
to the next essential step, which is authorisation.  For these reasons, it is important to focus on the issue 
of multifactor authentication, in particular where biometric methods play an important role. 
Biometric characteristics of humans are not transferable (by the mean of originality) and so they 
cannot be lost by normal circumstances. Biometrics can be used as authentication for the highest 
security level especially the hidden forms of biometrics. The demands for biometric verification were 
clarified (see the corresponding section). Static biometric samples still contain significant security risk 
of accepting frauds which use fraudulent (counterfeit) biometric samples (fake fingerprint, iris image, 
etc.). Static biometric authentication even has the risk of the user physically forced authentication. Users 
can be authenticated against their will by putting their biometrics into scanners, or even drastically steal 
the original biometry of the user, e.g. cut down the user’s finger and use it to bypass the authentication 
(this can be partially eliminated by checking the biometric sample aliveness). For these reasons the 
focus has shifted on the dynamic biometric methods which capture the hidden parameters of the human 
expression and the behaviourism of a particular person in time (see listed in Table 2).  
The final decision of authentication method is selected from the listed dynamic biometric 
methods. The decision is based on the following conditions and circumstances (gradually eliminated by 
the selection of dynamic biometric methods): 
 
Area and space independency 
Walking dynamics is eliminated because for accurate walk sensing fine-tuned circumstances and 
enough space is required. Voice / speech is not applicable for the surrounding area noise/buzz. 
 
Process continuity and stability: 
Generally: in static systems the variables can be uniquely determined by the present values 
of control/input variables, in contrast to the dynamic systems whose output (status) is dependent not 
only on the present value of the input but also on previous values of inputs and conditions of the system 
(depending on the depth of memory ). The more time is scanned the more accurate the system could be 
(in this case a person identification).  
Empirically: the idea that the user should be pursued in a long time for authentication is absurd 
(too time-consuming). In dynamic behaviour the longer time perspective additionally integrates mistakes 
by ambient conditions. There can be signs of interruption of routine behaviour while the person 
authentication which could be then detected as a fake user (in the case of circumstances ignorance) 
and causes errors. So we are looking for a main authentication method which could be done at once 
and without ambient disturbance. Discontinuous process could be stumbling while walking (so it 
eliminated from the final selection) or interrupted by a conversation of another person, mood symptoms, 
interruption with a non-standard idea or thought: dynamics of keyboard or console pressing, mouse 
movement dynamics, dynamic touch screens. These methods were eliminated from the selection this 
way. Partly the methods of: facial gestures, eye movements and lips movements could be eliminated 
from the final selection due to the impact of the surrounding circumstances (physical, psychical state 
of the user). These remaining method mostly serve as additional authentication e.g. whether the subject 
is alive (discussed further). 
The handwritten signature can be done at once. It is common for the person providing a signature 
to be exposed to stress, one reason for this being the importance of the situation in which they are 
appending the signature. After all, stress and very often negative stress, is one of the most common 
emotion in human life. In a different experiment it was examined whether and in what way stress 
influences the quality and constancy of DBS. In the experiments made by Smejkal, Kodl and Sieger 
(2016) extreme situations were used in which test subjects in survival courses (X-tream course) at the 
University of Defence of the Czech Republic found themselves, while used the d2 Test of Attention and 
signature stability at the start, in the middle, and at the end of the course. The results of the experiments 
EMI, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2017  





showed that irrespective of the stress levels of the participants, the stability of their DBS was high, 
respectively actually improved. 
 
To be user-friendly and acceptable for users 
This is a subjective matter of each individual. Empirically, to encourage the users to make 
grimaces (facial gestures), sticking out her tongue (lip movements) or move the eyes may not be 
acceptable for all the users. These methods could be used rather than complementary methods (voice / 
speech-lip movements as aliveness check of the user). Signature is a natural, easily available, well-
known tool for users to prove their identity. Earlier experiment showed that DBS is also well accepted by 
the users (see Hortai, 2017) so we can presume it is also user-friendly. 
 
Test the subject aliveness via automated remote testing: 
In personal contact the aliveness is obvious. When remotely communicating occurs the aliveness 
of the user has to be checked. Voice/speech is transmittable via electronical communication channels 
but forgeries with sound recordings, etc. still represent security risks. Aliveness test could be solved by 
interactivity of the verified person that goes on in spite of the above conditions (can be used 
independently from space - ambient noise, noise, process continuity - can be interrupted; acceptability 
to users - to answer questions of a personal nature by proving knowledge).  
When remotely communicating occurs in the case of DBS we can assume an axiom that each 
signature is unique (empirically: two similar created signatures from the same person will never be 
100% identical). This topic is solved in the conclusion part.  
Paper results 
To use biometric authentication a measurable biometry is demanded. Biometric data must 
undergo the legislation of the given country which is mostly regulated by the law of protection 
of personal data. Table 3 collects the regulations and standards for biometric methods and technology, 
mainly the joint technical committee of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) whose purpose is to develop, maintain and promote 
standards in the fields of information technology (IT) and Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT). 
Table 3: List of standards related to biometrics 
Label Name 
ISO/IEC 2382-37 Information technology –Vocabulary - Part 37: Biometrics 
ISO/IEC 7816-11 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 11: Personal verification 
through biometric methods 
ISO/IEC 19792 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Security evaluation of 
biometrics 
ISO/IEC 19794-1 Information technology – Biometric data interchange formats –  
Part 1: Framework 
ISO/IEC 19794-10 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 10: Hand 
geometry silhouette data 
ISO/IEC 19794-11 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 11: 
Signature/sign processed dynamic data 
ISO/IEC 19794-14 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 14: DNA 
data 
ISO/IEC 19794-2 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 2: Finger 
minutiae data 
ISO/IEC 19794-3 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 3: Finger 
pattern spectral data 
ISO/IEC 19794-4 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 4: Finger 
image data 
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ISO/IEC 19794-5 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 5: Face 
image data 
ISO/IEC 19794-6 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 6: Iris 
image data 
ISO/IEC 19794-7 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 7: 
Signature/sign time series data 
ISO/IEC 19794-8 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 8: Finger 
pattern skeletal data 
ISO/IEC 19794-9 Information technology -- Biometric data interchange formats -- Part 9: 
Vascular image data 
ISO/IEC 19795-1 Information technology -- Biometric performance testing and reporting -- Part 
1: Principles and framework 
ISO/IEC 19795-2 Information technology -- Biometric performance testing and reporting -- Part 
2: Testing methodologies for technology and scenario evaluation 
ISO/IEC 19795-4 Information technology -- Biometric performance testing and reporting -- Part 
4: Interoperability performance testing 
ISO/IEC 19795-7 Information technology -- Biometric performance testing and reporting -- Part 
7: Testing of on-card biometric comparison algorithms 
ISO/IEC TR 19795-3 Information technology -- Biometric performance testing and reporting -- Part 
3: Modality-specific testing 
ISO/IEC 19785-2 Information technology -- Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework -
- Part 2: Procedures for the operation of the Biometric Registration Authority 
ISO/IEC 19785-4 Information technology -- Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework -
- Part 4: Security block format specifications 
ISO/IEC 24761 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Authentication context for 
biometrics 
ISO/IEC 24745 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Biometric information 
protection 
P CEN/TS 16428 Biometrics Interoperability profiles - Best Practices for slap tenprint captures 
ISO 19092 Financial services -- Biometrics -- Security framework 
 
Advantages of biometric verification 
 During the life of the individuals some biometric characteristics does not change (e.g. DNA) or 
has very slow change in time (vein in your arm). 
 Biometric technologies have high percentage of reliability (depending on the method and 
implementation). 
 The applicants have the proof of identity always with them. The users do not need to worry 
about the loss or theft of the authentication tools or to worry about forgetting passwords. 
 High resistance to the theft of the original mark (included in the body of the user). 
Disadvantages of biometric verification 
Biometric technologies need to use additional hardware (e.g. biometric scanner). Compared to 
other authentication factors it has relatively higher complexity and could have difficulty for the technical 
and financial resources (system implementation, evaluation algorithms, sensors, creating a database 
of patterns) which depend on the chosen biometric method. 
It is required that the users participate in the creation of authentication patters (creating 
biometrics pattern, etc.) compared to other authentication factors which can be sent by e-mail 
(password) or delivered (auth. tools). 
It has various errors, the values of FAR and FRR. 
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Possibilities of counterfeiting the biometric systems which can be: 
 On the side of the sensor: the static biometrics are weak against fake biometric features e.g. 
synthetic models (e.g. synthetized fake fingerprint, rubber facial mask reassembled from 
authorized users’ characteristics). This option is not valid for dynamic biometrics. 
 On the side of the processing / comparison: extractor modification, modification of templates, 
exchange in the pattern database, blocking the communication channel (man-in-the-middle 
attacks). 
To eliminate these threats it is necessary to secure the database characteristics patterns and 
secure the communication channels of the verification devices and sensors. 
Measurements of DBS (dynamic biometric signature) 
DBS were recorded on the devices using the program signoSign2 (version 10.4.5) produced by 
Signotec. Each participant made 10 signatures on each device to a separate *.pdf file. From the 10 
times signed pdf file the biometric data were exported, so the final matrix of signatures of each 
participant and all devices was formed: Pij = [x1, … ,x10]ij  ; where i is a serial number of the device, j is 
a serial number of the participant, xk (k = 1, … , 10) is the particular signature.  
In accordance with the findings from the previous works (Smejkal, Kodl, 2014; Smejkal et al., 
2016), the first signatures made by each person on the devices were not included in the evaluation. For 
the signature match rate automatic evaluation a special algorithm was created which uses the original 
analytical software of the device manufacturer (Signotec - eSig-Analyze). The end result was a data 
matrix where the signature matches were evaluated among themselves in percent for every person 
each. Every person (40 people) had 8 times (number of the devices) 10 signatures which in one case 
had 36 signature alikeness comparisons. The overall 11520 signature alikeness comparison data were 
then used for calculations. The following values of selective means and unbiased estimates for 
variances of the degree of compliance of signatures were detected on the stated devices (Table 4):  
 
Table 4: The selective means and unbiased estimates for variances of the degree of compliance of 
signatures on the tested devices 
Device and scanning method x [%] S2 
Alpha - ERT 80.342 113.019 
Delta - ERT 76.749 238.268 
Gamma - ERT 78.971 232.027 
OmegaNew - TD 76.022 228.052 
OmegaOld - TD 83.002 125.844 
SigmaLite - WD 77.097 148.574 
SigmaNew - TD 85.233 139.194 
SigmaOld - TD 77.195 120.338 
 
The result characterizing the technology as a whole, i.e. without differentiation of types of devices 
and signers (i.e. for all people on all devices) is the average percentage 79.33 % with the standard 
deviation of σ = 13.16 %. The selective mean of the degree of compliance of signatures came under 
an accepted level of compliance of biometric signatures > 60% only in case of two people.  
There was no statistically significant difference in the means and variances of the degree 
of compliance of signatures of a particular person on individual devices. The different scanning 
technology does not affect the degree of compliance and variability of signatures (see Table 3). In the 
opinion of the authors, the "user-friendliness" is a key factor in creating the signature. Another factor is 
then the individual characteristics of the signer. The variability of the signature, and hence the low 
degree of compliance among individual signatures, which is exceptionally manifested among the 
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signers, is closely related to the stability of the signature. The greater the intra-personal variability is, 
the less stable the signer is (see Parziale et al., 2015).  
Conclusion 
In summary it can be concluded that every type of security method can undergo attacks. These 
threats can be reduced by using various authentication methods in combination with each other. On the 
other hand, the combination of too much authentication methods will lead to a rise in costs and 
an increased level of the user "harassment". 
In the case of biometric systems it is advisable to choose a biometry that is “easily” measurable 
and have stable properties in time. It is a wise choice for a user-friendly method no to disturb the users 
too much (which includes the necessary steps for authenticating and the time consuming part for this). 
To be able to authenticate all users all the users have to possess this biometry. Depending on the 
secured values (access to values, documents) a compromise should be considered between the 
secured values and the cost of effectiveness of the chosen authentication method.  
Based on the conditions in the discussion part, the dynamic biometric signature (DBS) was 
selected as the main dynamic biometric authentication method which can be suitable for e.g. business 
and intercorporate communication. Signature is a natural, easily available, well-known tool for users to 
prove their identity. Earlier experiment showed that DBS is also well accepted by the users. 
When authenticating a person, we generally employ the “1 to many” model, meaning that we 
compare the scanned record with all the records in the database of people. Some disadvantages of this 
are the higher risk of mistaken identification and high demands on computing power in the system. We 
remove this problem by using a prior identification step (entering identification data such as name, 
number, ID etc.), which can be done both in the case of authentication using a general record and also 
for authentication using a signature. To ensure higher safety (by means of lower global FAR value) and 
to lower the processing demands the verification should be based on 1-to-1 comparison (while 
verification the user’s biometric signature is compared to their specific signature). In the case of DBS the 
user is obvious due the signing process. 
As it was discussed, each individual has an individual set of component movements. This 
enables verification of the signature to be based on the stability of the set of component movements 
during their implementation. A decisive indicator for a DBS is that this unique set significantly eliminates 
the possibility of its reconstruction by a counterfeiter. Regarding alleged changes in a signature due to 
aging and other influences, it is important to realise that two identical signatures do not exist – or rather, 
if they are identical, we can be sure that they are a so-called technical forgery, produced by copying 
from a specimen. Hence it is crucial to know how the level of agreement between the signature and its 
specimen should be set for automatic evaluation to ensure that handwriting experts only receive 
signatures in exceptional cases. One important attribute of the DBS is that it contains not only the 
element that the writer is alive, but also the fact that the signature was created by the writer consciously, 
and so there is no need to develop additional mechanisms to test whether the subject is present and 
alive or not – unlike with static biometric methods (checking the print of a finger, palm, iris etc.) It is also 
legally beneficial that we can rely on the (theoretically rebuttable) assumption that the person knew what 
he or she was signing. 
DBS has the advantage compared to other dynamic authentication that the signature can be used 
immediately in authentication. For this authentication method no special premises or longer period 
of time is required (compered to e.g. walking dynamics). Signing is a stable, non-interrupted process 
due to the signature process done at once.  
Legislation: the ISO/IEC 19794-7 standard (Information technology — Biometric data interchange 
formats — Part 7: Signature/sign time series data standard) specify the scanned channels which are 
recorded in the DBS. According to ISO/IEC 19794-7 standard the following channels are recorded 
(in effect the parameters DBS) in Table 5:  
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Table 5:  DBS channels 
 
 
Scanning dynamic parameters when creating a signature is done through a special signature 
tablet. During the retrieval of signature data the tablet acquires biometric data (usually x and y 
coordinates, pressure, time). These biometric data are also used to calculate other parameters defined 
by ISO/IEC 19794-11 Information technology. Biometric data interchange formats. Part 11: 
Signature/sign processed dynamic data.  
To use DBS on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the 
internal market, the given country regulation has to be used and for the internal intercorporate 
communication the security policy of the organization has to be used. DBS can assure protection 
against signature frauds, environmental friendliness (saving paper), and direct insertion into electronic 
information systems where it ensures the integrity of the signed document. In this case the regulation 
in EU No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (repealing Directive 
1999/93/EC) has to be followed. The dynamic biometric signature is in accordance with the eIDAS 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council), which 
became valid on 17 September 2014 and focuses on the secure identification of people in electronic 
communication, respectively the provision of remote services. DBS is not a replacement for 
a cryptographic electronic signature, but an important alternative that can be used in cases when the 
use of certificates, the secure storage and “policing” of private keys, etc. would significantly impact 
routine and stable processes, and potentially form a barrier discouraging normal users and also bringing 
significant organisational and technical problems during the deployment of a guaranteed or qualified 
electronic signature (Advanced Electronic Signature, Qualified Electronic Signature) under the eIDAS 
Regulation.  Its advantage over a cryptographic electronic signature is the existence of this 
“handwritten” quality. 
In case of DBS technology the used channels (defined by ISO/IEC 19794-7 standard), the used 
acquiring technology, the evaluating algorithm, and the performance may vary among the technology 
manufacturers. The FAR and FRR are also dynamical and related to the users’ intra-personal variability, 
the length of his or her signature itself, etc. One of the main new findings was that no statistically 
significant difference in the means and variances of the degree of compliance of signatures of 
a particular person on individual devices. 
Costs related by implementing an authentication system (purchasing, service, user training, etc.) 
depend on the types of authentication technology used (accuracy, options, multifactor authentication, 
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etc. of the system), the size of the company, number of employees, etc. The communication and the 
sensitivity of secured data also is important. It makes no sense to implement strong authentication to 
secure data that in case they would be lost or abused would have caused less damage than the costs 
of implement of the chosen authentication system. In this case other risk reduction or risk retention 
should be used. 
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